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THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF LEAD LAWYERS
AND JUDGES IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATIONS
Charles Silver*
Recent developments in multidistrict litigations (MDLs) raise important
questions about the responsibilities of lead attorneys 1 and judges.
Increasingly, lead attorneys seem to use their control of settlement
negotiations to enhance their compensation. In a prior article co-authored
with Professor Geoffrey P. Miller, I argued that this conduct violates lead
lawyers’ fiduciary responsibilities. 2 But judges approve of this behavior
instead of reining it in.
Judge Eldon E. Fallon, who presides over the massive Vioxx MDL, 3
found my critique unconvincing. In an order on common benefit fees and
costs, he explained why, in his view, the self-enriching actions of the lead
attorneys in that MDL were appropriate.4 He also criticized a proposal
Professor Miller and I set out for selecting and compensating lead lawyers
in MDLs. 5 When doing so, he relied on a draft study by Carolyn A. Dubay,
formerly a researcher at the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), who also found
our proposal wanting. 6

* Roy W. and Eugenia C. McDonald Endowed Chair in Civil Procedure and Co-Director of
the Center on Lawyers, Civil Justice and the Media, School of Law, University of Texas at
Austin. Professor Silver consults with attorneys involved in litigation and assisted lawyers
with Vioxx-related cases.
1. In this Article, I use the phrases “lead lawyers” and “lead attorneys” to describe
lawyers formally appointed to positions of authority in MDLs, and the phrases “disabled
lawyers” and “disabled attorneys” to describe lawyers denied such appointments. A third
category includes lawyers not formally appointed to positions of authority who perform and
are compensated for common benefit work, i.e., legal services deemed to be of value for all
plaintiffs with cases in an MDL. For convenience, I include disabled lawyers who perform
common benefit work in the lead attorney category. For descriptions of the positions of
authority in MDLs, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.2 (2004).
2. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010).
3. Order & Reasons, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Oct. 19,
2010).
4. Id. at 3–8, 12–15 & nn.15–16.
5. Id. at 3 n.4.
6. CAROLYN A. DUBAY, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TRENDS AND PROBLEMS IN THE
APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION OF COMMON BENEFIT COUNSEL IN COMPLEX MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TEN MEGA MDLS 7–8, 59–62 (July 2010) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review). Given the role I played in sparking the Federal Judicial
Center’s interest in MDLs, I am reminded of Gore Vidal’s observation that “no good deed
goes unpunished.” See infra Part IV.
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In this Article, I respond to the criticisms made by Judge Fallon and
Dubay. The analysis builds on my work with Professor Miller and also on
the article in this issue that I co-authored with Professor Lynn A. Baker. 7 I
encourage readers to become familiar with those writings before tackling
this one.
I. BACKGROUND ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATIONS
An MDL is created when the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML) transfers related cases pending in diverse federal district courts to a
designated forum for consolidated pretrial motions and discovery. When
the cases are ready for trial, the MDL judge is supposed to send them back
to their original forums. 8 Remands are so uncommon, however, that MDLs
have been compared to “black holes.”9 Cases sent into MDLs rarely escape
their grip.
After the JPML transfers cases to an MDL forum, lawyers who were
formerly litigating separately must coordinate their efforts. They must
establish a governance structure that will divide tasks, assign
responsibilities, monitor performance, and make decisions. They must also
decide whether fees and costs will be shared and, if so, on what terms.
In theory, lawyers could create governance structures themselves. In
practice, MDL judges usually take charge of this task. They empower a
small number of lead lawyers to exercise managerial authority on the
plaintiffs’ side and relegate the rest of the lawyers to passive positions. I
use the label “disabled lawyers” to describe lawyers denied lead counsel
positions because their ability to act for their clients in the MDL is limited.
Lead attorneys enjoy plenary and, in many respects, exclusive control of
the litigation. Although they report to and receive input from disabled
attorneys, they are independent actors who operate subject to no one’s
control. Disabled lawyers cannot tell lead attorneys what to do; nor can
they fire them for disobedience. If disabled lawyers dislike the way lead
lawyers are performing, their only recourse is to complain to the trial judge,
who, for a variety of reasons, is unlikely to be sympathetic.
Plaintiffs also have little control of lead lawyers. Although a lawyer
must normally follow a client’s lawful marching orders as given, there is no
evidence that lead attorneys look to their clients for instructions when
deciding how to handle MDLs. For example, when, as sometimes happens,
bellwether trials occur in MDLs, lead lawyers decide which cases will be
tried (or recommended to the MDL judge as candidates for trial) without
asking the plaintiffs whether they favor bellwether trials or agree with the
choice of cases. The same is true when lead attorneys initiate global
7. See Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees: Preliminary Thoughts,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1833 (2011).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006); see infra note 70.
9. See, e.g., Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL.
L. REV. 2323, 2330 & n.21 (2008); Brent M. Rosenthal, Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 63
SMU L. REV. 845, 851 (2010); Gary Wilson et al., The Future of Products Liability in
America, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 85, 104 & n.108, 112 (2000).
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settlement negotiations. They do not ask plaintiffs for permission to
negotiate.
Lead attorneys in MDLs closely resemble lawyers who litigate class
actions. Both enjoy considerable independence from the persons they
represent. No class member can tell class counsel what to do, not even the
named plaintiff. 10 In practical effect, a lawyer representing a class is an
independent actor or a trustee, not an agent. The same is true of lawyers
assigned to managerial positions in MDLs.
Judges recognize the similarities between class actions and MDLs. They
refer to MDLs as “quasi-class actions,” and they borrow freely from class
action jurisprudence managing MDLs. 11 For example, when compensating
lead attorneys or reimbursing their expenses, judges draw upon
restitutionary doctrines that evolved in class actions. 12 They also take note
of the size of fee awards in class actions when deciding how much lead
attorneys in MDLs should be paid. 13
II. ARE LEAD ATTORNEYS FIDUCIARIES?
The fiduciary duty requires an agent to act solely for a principal’s benefit
when acting on the principal’s behalf. The duty prohibits an agent from
using his or her powers to benefit a third party or for personal gain.
Ordinary attorneys are fiduciaries. Attorneys who handle class actions are
fiduciaries too. There are differences between ordinary attorneys and class
counsel, of course, an important one being that an ordinary lawyer is an
agent while an attorney representing a class more closely resembles a
trustee. The assertion that both lawyers are fiduciaries has merit, even so,
because both lawyers must ignore their own interests when representing
others. As explained in the article Professor Baker and I co-authored, this
means that both lawyers may properly enhance their compensation only as a
side-effect of increasing their entrustors’ recoveries. 14
Given that both lawyers who represent individual claimants and lawyers
who handle class actions are fiduciaries, it would be surprising to discover
that lead lawyers in MDLs were not. Yet, insofar as legal doctrine is
concerned, the matter is uncertain. Although commentators argue that lead
attorneys are fiduciaries and should be treated as such, solid authority for
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1) advisory committee’s note (“Appointment as class counsel
means that the primary obligation of counsel is to the class rather than to any individual
members of it. The class representatives do not have an unfettered right to ‘fire’ class
counsel. In the same vein, the class representatives cannot command class counsel to accept
or reject a settlement proposal. To the contrary, class counsel must determine whether
seeking the court’s approval of a settlement would be in the best interests of the class as a
whole.”). Class actions brought under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA) are an exception to this observation. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2006). In
these cases, large investors appointed to lead plaintiff positions exercise real control of class
counsel. Id.
11. See Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 110 & n.7 (detailing the historical background
of the “quasi-class action”); id. at 110–11, 114–18.
12. Id. at 109–10, 122–30.
13. Id.
14. Baker & Silver, supra note 7, at 1836–42.

1988

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

the proposition is surprisingly scarce. The MDL statute does not address
the matter and the common law is undeveloped. 15
Consider the statement of lead lawyers’ responsibilities that appears in
the Manual for Complex Litigation (the Manual), which requires lead
attorneys to “act fairly, efficiently, and economically in the interests of all
parties and parties’ counsel.” 16 The decision to recognize disabled lawyers
and claimants separately makes sense, for the fortunes of both rest in lead
attorneys’ hands. Even so, the language used in the Manual falls short of
stating the fiduciary standard. The phrase “all parties and parties’
counsel” 17 includes the lead attorneys. The Manual might therefore imply
that lead attorneys can consider their own interests and can put their own
interests on par with those of claimants and disabled lawyers. The fiduciary
duty requires a lawyer to ignore his or her own interests. It does not permit
a lawyer to engage in self-enriching behavior as long as a client is treated
“fairly.”
Relying on the passage in the Manual discussed above, the Principles of
the Law of Aggregate Litigation (the Principles), which the American Law
Institute (ALI) published in 2010, concludes that lead attorneys in MDLs
are fiduciaries. 18 However, it does not examine the ambiguity just pointed
out. It also later states that “[t]o promote adequate representation, judges
may . . . enforce fiduciary duties on named parties and their attorneys.”19
This seems to imply that it is up to MDL judges to decide whether lead
attorneys are fiduciaries or not.
Illustration 4 to § 1.05 in the Principles suggests that this implication was
not intended. It assumes that “Lawyers I, O, and P [represent hundreds of
clients with asbestos-related claims],” 20 that the clients’ cases are
consolidated in an MDL, and that the MDL judge “appoints Lawyer T, who
also has cases there, to the position of Lead Counsel.” 21 It then states flatly
that “Lawyer T becomes a fiduciary to all plaintiffs and lawyers in the
consolidated proceedings and may not use her position to enrich herself at
their expense.” 22
The Principles also recognizes that lead attorneys are fiduciaries of a
certain kind. Some fiduciaries are forbidden from helping one beneficiary
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
16. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, § 10.22.
17. Id.
18. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.04 reporter’s notes cmt. a
(2010) (observing that “[c]lass counsel is a [] fiduciary to a client[, the named plaintiff,] who
is also a fiduciary [to other class members],” and that “[a] similar relationship obtains
between lead attorneys and other lawyers in a multidistrict litigation”). I was an Associate
Reporter on the Principles and bore primary responsibility for Chapter One. However, like
other American Law Institute (ALI) projects, the Principles was a collaborative undertaking.
The entire project, including Chapter One, benefited enormously from comments and
contributions made by all the Reporters and by other members of the ALI, including
Professor Howard M. Erichson, the organizer of this Symposium.
19. Id. § 1.05(c)(3) (emphasis added).
20. Id. § 1.05 illus. 2, 4.
21. Id. § 1.05 illus. 4.
22. Id.
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at the expense of another. Normally, lawyers fall into this group. By
subordinating one client’s interests to another’s without informed consent, a
lawyer would act disloyally. Other fiduciaries are allowed to make
tradeoffs. Trustees are the exemplars of this group. A trustee may use
entrusted assets to send one beneficiary to college even though less money
will be available to help another beneficiary as a result. When making
tradeoffs among beneficiaries, trustees need only be reasonable and fair.
The Principles suggests that lead attorneys resemble trustees more than
lawyers or other agents. Their responsibility is to “pursu[e] the good of
all,” which, if need be, they may do by making tradeoffs that are reasonably
“likely to maximize the value of all claims in the group.” 23
In one respect, then, the Principles is good authority for the position I
espouse. It states unequivocally that lead attorneys are fiduciaries. In
another respect, though, the Principles has no authority at all. The ALI can
identify what its members regard as good practices and doctrines, but the
organization has no power to make law. Moreover, on the point at issue,
the Reporters’ Notes to § 1.05 cite no statutory or common law authority.
In this respect, the Principles resembles the Manual, which cites no
authority either. Both volumes thus show plainly that the law governing
lead lawyers’ responsibilities is immature.
Given the dearth of authority directly on point, judges may take guidance
from other bodies of law. If they do, they will quickly conclude that lead
attorneys are fiduciaries. Mass tort lawyers are fiduciaries,24 and so are
lawyers who represent plaintiff classes.25 These examples are the most
analogous to lead counsel.
Lead lawyers are certainly fiduciaries to their signed clients. In an MDL,
therefore, the question is not whether lead attorneys are fiduciaries—they
are—but to whom their responsibilities extend. In particular, it is important
to know whether they must treat non-client claimants as well as they treat
their clients. The basis for an affirmative answer is clear. To the extent that
lead attorneys displace disabled lawyers, they assume disabled lawyers’
duties, including the fiduciary duty to refrain from exploiting clients.

23. Id. § 1.05 cmt. f. The argument that lead attorneys resemble trustees more than
agents draws support from several facts, including the inability of entrustors to select lead
attorneys, fire them, or control them, and the absence of market mechanisms that ordinarily
encourage agents to perform well. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 127–28 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
24. See, e.g., Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 81 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that “the
Defendants,” who represented a group of plaintiffs with asbestos claims, “were acting as the
Plaintiffs’ attorneys,” and that “[i]t is well-settled law, regardless of jurisdiction, that
attorneys owe their clients a fiduciary duty” (citing Akron Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 819
N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ohio 2004)).
25. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, § 21.12 (“[A]n attorney
acting on behalf of a putative class must act in the best interests of the class as a whole.”
(citing FED. R. CIV. P 23(g)(2)(A) advisory’s committee note; 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. &
W WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 38.4, at 38-7 (3d ed. 2002)); In re Pharm.
Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 36 n.12 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted) (“Class counsel are fiduciaries to the class.”).
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Otherwise, MDL procedures would alter plaintiffs’ substantive rights by
allowing lead attorneys to take advantage of them.
First principles also support the conclusion that lead attorneys are
fiduciaries. In contractual principal-agent relationships, a fiduciary duty is
implied when an agent armed with “open-ended management power” can
help a principal or act to a principal’s detriment. 26 The fiduciary duty
protects the principal from exploitation by allowing the principal to demand
ex post judicial review of the agent’s behavior. 27 In MDLs, lead attorneys
possess immense power and discretion. Consequently, non-client claimants
are at risk of being exploited and require the protection the fiduciary duty
provides. The ALI’s Principles takes this position. Section 1.05
encourages judges to ensure passive parties are adequately represented in all
aggregate proceedings and it identifies the fiduciary duty as a tool to further
this goal.28
To this point, the discussion of lead attorneys’ responsibilities has
focused on non-client claimants whose retained lawyers are disabled.
Because disabled lawyers also have interests at stake in MDLs, one must
also ask whether lead lawyers have fiduciary responsibilities to them. That
disabled lawyers are at risk of being exploited is clear. In the Vioxx MDL,
the lead attorneys asked for $388 million in common benefit fees, 8% of the
$4.85 billion recovery. 29 This eye-popping sum was to come from the
pockets of disabled lawyers, whose contractual fees would be cut so that
lead attorneys could be paid. The possibility of over-reaching is clear.
First, Judge Fallon awarded $73 million less than the lead attorneys
requested, showing that, in his opinion, they over-valued their services by
almost 20 percent.30 Second, the lead attorneys may have used their control
of settlement negotiations to prevent disabled lawyers from complaining.
The settlement agreement they negotiated required all disabled lawyers to
waive their objections to the common benefit fee tax as a condition for
enrolling clients.31 Because disabled lawyers had to do what their clients
wanted, those whose clients were better off settling were forced to submit.
Plainly, the lead attorneys may have strategized to the disabled lawyers’
disadvantage.
The fiduciary duty can protect disabled lawyers while still permitting
lead attorneys’ to do their jobs. Although a fiduciary duty would prevent
lead attorneys from using their control of settlement negotiations to enrich
themselves at disabled lawyers’ expense, it would leave them completely
free to do so by increasing claimants’ recoveries. This is what they are
supposed to use their powers to do. The duty would also allow lead

26. Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 215.
27. Id.
28. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 18, § 1.05(b), (c)(3).
29. See Order & Reasons, supra note 3, at 9.
30. Id. at 37.
31. See Master Settlement Agreement § 1.2.4, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007) (requiring waiver of objections).
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attorneys to apply to the MDL court for common benefit compensation, just
as lawyers do in successful class actions.
III. THE LEAD ATTORNEYS’ ACTIONS IN THE VIOXX MDL
The business model for MDLs and similar state court consolidations
constantly evolves. Techniques that are completely unprecedented first
emerge as experiments by judges and lead attorneys. Innovations that
further the central players’ interests are quickly adopted in other
proceedings, even if the practices seem dubious. Because appellate courts
rarely interfere with trial judges’ management of MDLs, questionable
practices can persist for years. 32
Consider practices relating to common benefit fees and expenses. Very
little authority addresses these practices, and almost none of it comes from
appellate courts. Although MDL judges force disabled lawyers to cover
lead lawyers’ fees and expenses, the legal basis for these coercive transfers
is unclear. 33 The MDL statute says nothing about compensation. Federal
judges’ inherent power to manage their dockets, which empowers them to
fine lawyers who act improperly, provides no basis for orders that force
innocent lawyers to give up millions of dollars. The strongest justification
is provided by the restitutionary theory that supports fee awards in class
actions, but that theory does not work in MDLs, for reasons Professor
Miller and I explained.34
Despite these shortcomings and the enormity of the stakes, appellate
courts have provided little guidance. When Judge Fallon awarded $315
million in common benefit fees in Vioxx, the only Fifth Circuit authority he
could cite was a 1977 case, In re Air Crash Disaster. 35 There, the trial
judge ordered two lawyers to pay the lead attorneys $270,000 after the
lawyers refused the trial judge’s offer to share the workload in the MDL.36
In a confusing and haphazardly reasoned opinion that provides little
authority for current practices, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 37
Recognizing that the legal basis for common benefit fee and cost awards
is questionable, MDL judges and lead attorneys have sought to lend these
forced transfers a consensual veneer. 38 They first attempted to do so by
promulgating form contracts for disabled lawyers to sign. 39 The contracts

32. On the rarity of appellate review of MDL judges’ management decisions, see
Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1645 (2011) (observing that “[t]he MDL
system creates [a] sort of ‘kingly power’ in trial judges” and that “there is no appellate
jurisdiction over most interlocutory MDL orders”).
33. Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 126–35 & nn.85–89 (discussing the practice and
citing various cases where such orders were issued).
34. Id. at 109, 121–30.
35. 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977).
36. See id. at 1008, 1010–11.
37. Id. at 1021.
38. Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 135.
39. Id. at 134–35.
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were shams, however, because disabled lawyers’ consent was coerced.40
They could not bargain over terms, decide which lead lawyers to employ, or
refuse to sign without penalty. 41 The form contracts were offers disabled
lawyers could not refuse. 42
The form contracts did not even lock in the price of common benefit
work for the disabled lawyers who signed them. In the Guidant MDL, the
court promulgated form agreements setting the price of common benefit
work at 4% of the gross monetary recovery. 43 The same judge later set
aside 18.5% of the $240 million recovery for the lead attorneys. 44 In Vioxx,
the contracts specified a 2% levy for fees.45 The lead attorneys nonetheless
demanded 8% of the $4.85 billion settlement and eventually received 6.5%
from the court. 46
In my opinion, the actions that led to the fee increases in Guidant and
Vioxx were opportunistic. In both MDLs, the lead attorneys used their
control of settlement negotiations to increase the amount of money
available for common benefit fees and to prevent disabled lawyers from
complaining. Yet, in neither MDL were the lead attorneys’ actions
condemned. To the contrary, they were reviewed and approved. Because
Vioxx presents the cleaner example and also offers Judge Fallon’s responses
to my complaints, I focus on it here.
As explained, Judge Fallon initially entered an order promulgating fee
and cost sharing contracts that set common benefit fees at 2% of the gross
recovery. 47 Provisions in the Vioxx Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
later (1) expressly superseded that order, (2) raised the cap on common
benefit fees to 8%, (3) required that the entire 8% be placed in escrow, (4)
made disabled lawyers (rather than claimants) liable for the entire amount,
and (5) required disabled lawyers and their clients to waive any and all
objections to the MSA as a condition for enrolling in the settlement. 48
40. See id. at 135.
41. See id.
42. This is, of course, a reference to the famous line from The Godfather. THE
GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972) ("I'm gonna make him an offer he can't refuse.").
For a thorough study of the many lessons The Godfather has for aggregate litigation, see
Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlement: The Godfather Guide to OptOut Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141.
43. Pretrial Order No. 6 at 3–4, In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB) (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2006).
44. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 051708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 451076, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2008). The order set aside
$10 million in cost reimbursements, only $3.5 million of which was slated to cover the
managerial attorneys’ out-of-pocket expenses. Id.
45. See Order & Reasons, supra note 3, at 5.
46. See id. at 9, 36–37.
47. Pretrial Order No. 19 at 3, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La.
Aug. 4, 2005) (creating a “full participation option” for disabled lawyers who signed form
contracts within ninety days and setting common benefit compensation at 2% for fees and
1% for costs). To keep the discussion simple, I ignore costs.
48. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 30, §§ 9.2.1, 9.2.3 (raising the limit on
common benefit fees, overriding Pretrial Order 19, and identifying lawyers’ contingent fees
as the source of funding); id. § 9.2.2 (authorizing an award of common benefit expenses); id.
§ 1.2.4 (requiring waiver of objections).
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Why these provisions appeared in the MSA is a mystery. Judge Fallon’s
order setting the 2% cap did not contain language allowing lawyers or
parties to override it by agreement. Therefore, the proper way to modify
the order was to ask Judge Fallon to revise it. That approach had a
downside, however. Had the lead lawyers filed a motion requesting an
increase in common benefit fees, disabled lawyers would have been entitled
to contest it, to make an opposing evidentiary presentation, and, had Judge
Fallon ruled against them, to appeal. Had the lead attorneys filed a motion
to raise the common benefit fee after the MSA was announced, they would
also have had no leverage over the disabled lawyers or their clients, their
services no longer being required.
The presence of fee-related provisions in the MSA also seems odd for
another reason: no one—not even the lead lawyers’ own signed clients—
authorized or instructed the lead attorneys to bargain with the defendant
over common benefit fees. The order appointing the plaintiffs’ steering
committee authorized it to pursue “settlement options pertaining to any
claim or portion thereof.” 49 This seems clearly to have meant claims the
plaintiffs had against the defendant, not claims the plaintiffs or their
lawyers had against each other. 50 Common benefit fees fall into the latter
category. Nor were negotiations over common benefit fees needed to
resolve any plaintiff’s claim. The lead attorneys seem to me simply to have
chosen to make a matter of interest solely to plaintiffs and their lawyers the
subject of settlement negotiations with the defendant.
To appreciate the oddity of this decision, imagine that a lawyer
representing a single plaintiff in a personal injury case negotiated a
settlement that overrode the existing contingent fee agreement, increased
the lawyer’s fee by 400%, and made the client waive any and all objections
to the lawyer’s actions as a condition for getting a payment. Imagine
further that the lawyer did all this without telling the client in advance,
obtaining the client’s consent, or explaining the conflict of interests. The
breach of the lawyer’s fiduciary duty, the lawyer’s lack of authority, and the
impropriety of negotiating fees with the defendant would all be self-evident.
I believe one should reach the same conclusions when evaluating the
behavior of the lead attorneys who negotiated the Vioxx MSA.
The only explanation I can think of for the decision to negotiate common
benefit fees with the defendant is that the lead attorneys saw an opportunity
49. Pretrial Order No. 6 at 3, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La.,
Apr. 8, 2005).
50. Further evidence of the speed with which MDL practices evolve can be found in an
order entered in the state court consolidation of Kugel Mesh cases in Rhode Island. Assented
to Assessment Order, In re All Individual Kugel Mesh Cases, No: PC-2008-9999 (R.I.
Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 2009). The order expressly authorizes the lead attorneys to negotiate a
“payment from [the] defendants . . . separate from and in addition to any payment made to
any plaintiff, which separate payment(s) is intended to be for common benefit attorneys[’]
fees and expenses.” Id. at 2. This authorization denies claimants adequate representation by
building a strong conflict into their relationship with the lead attorneys. For present
purposes, though, the important point is that someone recognized that lead attorneys lack
authority to negotiate common benefit fees with defendants and moved to correct the
problem by including the identified language in the appointment order.
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to prevent disabled lawyers from objecting. As mentioned, section 1.2.4 of
the Vioxx MSA provided that any lawyer who enrolled even a single client
in the settlement was “deemed to have agreed to be bound by all of the
terms and conditions” in the MSA, including the provisions relating to
common benefit fees. 51 Because the settlement was a good deal for many
claimants, disabled lawyers were whipsawed. The law in all jurisdictions
required them to communicate the settlement offer to their clients, to advise
all clients for whom the offer was a good deal to accept it, and to enroll any
client who wished to participate. Yet, to enroll even one client, a disabled
lawyer had to waive any and all complaints he or she personally had
relating to common benefit fees. To protect themselves, disabled lawyers
would have had to violate their duties to their clients. As far as I know,
none did.
Like the form contracts previously promulgated by the court, the Vioxx
MSA seems to me to have been designed to foster the false impression that
disabled lawyers freely consented to the 400% common benefit fee
increase. The lead attorneys sought to capitalize on this impression when
they applied for $388 million (8% of the gross recovery) in common benefit
fees. The demand was reasonable, they argued, because instead of “us[ing]
the MDL work-product, pay[ing] the [2%] assessment, and tak[ing] the
chance of trying their case to verdict before a jury,” 52 all but a few
claimants “voluntarily chose to participate in the Settlement Agreement
with Merck, which agreement clearly denotes the 8% assessment.”53
Professor Miller and I rated this argument “laughable.”54 The fiduciary
duty requires lawyers to refrain from using their powers to enrich
themselves. It does not recognize the possibility that a client might reject a
settlement offer as a reason for allowing a lawyer to act opportunistically
when negotiating on a client’s behalf. The law could not be otherwise.
Clients can always reject settlement offers. A contrary rule would therefore
allow plaintiffs’ attorneys to engage in self-enriching behavior in all
settlement negotiations.
Judge Fallon knew our position, but he sided with the lead attorneys
anyway. 55
The [2%] fee assessment agreements were reasonable and appropriate to
create a fund to compensate common benefit attorneys for the
consolidated MDL discovery work that was contemplated at that early
stage of the litigation. When circumstances changed as a result of the

51. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 30, § 1.2.4.
52. Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of
Plaintiffs’ Common Benefit Counsel Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 48, In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2009).
53. Id.
54. Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 135.
55. Judge Eldon E. Fallon also attacked us ad hominem. See Order & Reasons, supra
note 3, at 15 n.16 (noting that Professors Silver and Miller were “‘paid consultants to a group
of attorneys in the Vioxx MDL who have questioned or challenged aspects of the settlement,
including the fee assessment’” (quoting Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 107 n.*)). More
evidence that no good deed goes unpunished.
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extensive discovery, numerous trials, and through negotiation and
implementation of a global opt-in settlement, it became necessary to
reevaluate the reasonable compensation for the common benefit attorneys
who accomplished those tasks. The claimants and their attorneys
acknowledged those changed circumstances when they accepted the terms
of the Settlement Agreement which supplanted the [Pretrial Order (PTO)]
19 assessments. Settlement Agreement § 9.2.1. Moreover, the Court’s
equitable and managerial authority and duty to award fair common benefit
fees or to adjust contingent fees exists independent of contractual
agreement, and the Court’s authority to do justice by reducing attorneys’
fees necessarily encompasses the corollary authority to increase fees
where appropriate. 56

This passage is rife with mistakes.
First, if the 2% agreements were real contracts rather than shams, then
the fact (assuming it is one) that the lead attorneys did more work than they
expected was simply their bad luck. All contingent percentage fee
agreements assign the lawyer the risk associated with effort. Having set the
fee, the lawyer must live with it, even when the workload is unexpectedly
great. 57 The lead attorneys were stuck with the fees their signed clients
agreed to pay. Why they were not also stuck with the fees they put in the
2% agreements Judge Fallon did not say.
Second, Professor Miller and I never denied that the lead attorneys could
properly have asked Judge Fallon for a raise. To the contrary, we expressly
stated that “[t]o get around the agreements, . . . the lead attorneys might
have sought orders increasing the amounts set aside for common benefit
compensation,” 58 and we cited the Bextra MDL as an instance in which the
lead lawyers employed this straightforward approach. 59 Our complaint was
that the lead attorneys abused their control of the settlement negotiations.
Judge Fallon’s observation that he would have given them a raise, had they
asked, has no bearing on this point.
Third, Judge Fallon’s inference that claimants and disabled lawyers
acknowledged the merit of the lead attorneys’ demand for a raise is wholly
unwarranted. Insofar as the claimants were concerned, the decision to
enroll showed only that they preferred settling to continuing to fight. The
common benefit fee provisions were irrelevant to them because the money
came out of their lawyers’ pockets, not theirs. Insofar as the disabled
56. Order & Reasons, supra note 3, at 14 n.15 (citing In re Guidant Corp. Implantable
Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *11–
12 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008)).
57. A lawyer can ask a client to renegotiate, and the lead attorneys could have
renegotiated the 2% agreements with the disabled lawyers. They didn’t, presumably because
they knew that many, most, or all of the disabled lawyers would refuse to pay them more.
The lead attorneys’ failure to negotiate directly with disabled lawyers is another indication
that the disabled lawyers’ “consent” to the fee increase was coerced.
58. Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 132 (citing Pretrial Order No. 8A: Amendment to
Order Establishing Common Benefit Fund at 4, In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales
Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1699 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2008)).
59. See Pretrial Order No. 8A, supra note 58; Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 132 &
n.86.
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lawyers were concerned, one can infer nothing at all. The decision to settle
was the claimants’, not theirs. Disabled lawyers were legally bound to do
what their clients wanted, regardless of their personal wishes.
To see the flaw in Judge Fallon’s reasoning, one need only recognize its
potential to legitimate any provision the lead attorneys might have put into
the MSA. They might have commandeered 100% of disabled lawyers’
fees. They might have required enrollees to send letters recommending
them for the Nobel Peace Prize. According to Judge Fallon’s logic, a
claimant’s desire for a settlement check would legitimate these provisions
and others even more egregious. It cannot be right to allow lead attorneys
to use the threat to withhold settlement checks to gain unlimited leverage
over claimants and disabled lawyers.
The basic point is simple. As Judge Fallon recognized and as Professor
Miller and I pointed out, the lead attorneys could properly have obtained a
fee increase by requesting one from the court. Consequently, they need not
have included any provisions relating to the amount of common benefit fees
in the MSA. But they did. A possible explanation, which seems right to
me, is that they used their control of the settlement negotiations to pre-empt
the opposition they expected disabled lawyers to mount.
By putting their fees on the table when bargaining with the defendant, the
lead attorneys may have jeopardized the claimants’ interests too. Knowing
that the lead attorneys wanted its help, Merck would rationally have sought
to exchange cooperation on fees for concessions on other relief. Defendants
have often used this tactic to buy off attorneys in class actions. Merck
would have been foolish not to have employed it.
In an ordinary personal injury representation, a contingent fee lawyer’s
sole object when bargaining with a defendant is to obtain the most money
possible for the client. By maximizing the client’s recovery, the lawyer
also maximizes the fee. The harmony of interest between the lawyer and
the client is substantial, and the defendant has no control of the lawyer’s
compensation. Lead attorneys should maintain the same laser-like focus
when bargaining for global resolutions in MDLs. No one needs to know
how much a defendant thinks a group of lead attorneys should be paid. (A
candid defendant would say “nothing,” anyway.) Injecting fees into the
discussion also creates an enormous conflict between claimants and their
representatives, saddling claimants with inadequate representation and
denying them due process of law. Lead attorneys should use settlement
negotiations solely to maximize the value of plaintiffs’ claims. They should
resolve the size of common benefit fees by means of real agreements with
other plaintiffs’ attorneys or by seeking fee awards from MDL judges, who
can set them after holding evidentiary hearings in orders subject to appellate
review. 60

60. In Silver and Miller, supra note 2, at 160–69, I argue for a fee setting mechanism
similar to those set out in the PSLRA. The sentence in the text is not meant to contradict that
recommendation.
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IV. DUBAY’S CRITIQUE
When I began to study judicial management practices in MDLs, I was
struck by the scarcity of data. I wanted to know basic facts, such as which
lawyers were appointed to lead positions, how many signed clients they
had, how much they requested in common benefit fees, and how much they
received. Neither the JPML nor any other public body collected this
information. Settlement administrators had some of it, but they would not
share. I therefore decided to focus on the three recent MDLs—Guidant,
Vioxx, and Zyprexa—that were the source of the emerging quasi-class
action approach to MDL management and to learn about them from
published opinions and orders, newspaper stories, academic writings, and
similar materials.
Before abandoning my search for data, I contacted Thomas Willging, a
researcher at the FJC who did empirical studies of mass torts lawsuits, class
actions, and attorneys’ fees. I had long admired his work and had relied on
it many times. Willging, who has since retired, told me the FJC had no data
on MDLs. I encouraged him to make them the focus of a future FJC study.
Within months, the seed sprouted. In October 2008, Willging let me
know that the FJC planned to look at attorney fee awards in selected MDLs.
Thereafter, the tree quickly bore fruit. Preliminary drafts of studies
appeared in remarkably short order, including a paper Carolyn Dubay
presented at the 2010 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies.61 These
studies have great potential to lift the veil that has long hidden the internal
workings of MDLs from view.
I do not know how Judge Fallon came to have a copy of Dubay’s report
before it was published, but I am not surprised that he did. Because federal
judges take FJC studies seriously, the network of persons interested in
MDLs distributed Dubay’s report far and wide. Because Dubay also
disagreed with Professor Miller and me on certain points, it was natural for
Judge Fallon to rely on her work when criticizing us. 62 Unfortunately,
because Judge Fallon used her draft report as he did, to respond to him I
must criticize Dubay in print. That seems harsh, given that her report is just
a draft. I hope Dubay will forgive me for critiquing her preliminary
thoughts.
In most respects, Dubay is on the same page with Professor Miller and
me. We focused on products liability MDLs, so does Dubay. We studied
Guidant, Vioxx, and Zyprexa; she examined those MDLs plus seven more.
She identified three issues as “critical” ones for the next edition of the
Manual to address:
First, as to the appointment of common benefit counsel, guidance should
be developed for district courts on whether attorneys without cases

61. See DUBAY, supra note 6; see also Margaret S. Williams & Tracey E. George, Who
Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The Decision To Transfer and Consolidate
Multidistrict Litigation, presented at 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633703.
62. Order & Reasons, supra note 3, at 3 n.4.
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pending in the MDL may serve as common benefit attorneys. Second, as
to the compensation of common benefit counsel, guidance on the use of
common benefit compensation committees is needed in light of potential
conflict of interest issues that have arisen in existing MDLs. Third, as to
the determination of proper assessment rates for common benefit fee
awards, guidance is needed on whether and in what circumstances
differing assessment rates are fair and appropriate. 63

Professor Miller and I addressed all three subjects at length. Like us,
Dubay also emphasized the “lack of uniformity and transparency” that is
characteristic of MDLs, noting that “[d]ecisions are rarely published, rarely
appealed, and oftentimes records relating to fees are filed under seal.”64
However, when it comes to policy recommendations, Dubay’s object
differs from ours. She wants to make MDLs work better for judges, while
also making them more transparent and uniform. Because she was an
employee of the FJC, her desire to please judges is understandable.
Although Professor Miller and I recognize the judiciary’s legitimate interest
in avoiding duplication, our object is to improve the quality of the
representation claimants receive within the context of court-ordered
aggregation. We also want to restore judicial neutrality and to ensure that
MDL procedures are lawful. Because we are less concerned than Dubay
about pleasing judges, judges are likely to find her recommendations more
palatable than ours.
The passage below reflects this difference in philosophy. In it, Dubay
criticizes the proposal Professor Miller and I offered, which would give
control of MDLs to plaintiffs’ lawyers with valuable inventories of cases.
Those lawyers would then hire other attorneys to perform common benefit
work, the cost of which would be divided among all lawyers with cases in
an MDL in proportion to their clients’ recoveries. The controlling lawyers
would thus pay for common benefit work directly, would pay more than
disabled attorneys, and would bear the full risk of loss if the cases were
dismissed. They would therefore benefit by hiring lawyers capable of
performing common benefit work at the best combination of quality and
price. When it comes to managing plaintiffs’ affairs, judges would have
about the same level of involvement in MDLs as they do in securities class
actions brought under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995. 65
Dubay disagrees with us over the advisability of putting lawyers with
valuable inventories of cases in charge. She argues that
[h]aving a large stake in [an] MDL does not guarantee good
communication skills, the effective use of attorney time, or even the best
lawyering. Instead, the role of the MDL judge demands the ability to
effective[ly] coordinate not only the many cases within the MDL, but
state cases as well. Moreover, the most experienced and effective
63. DUBAY, supra note 6, at 6.
64. Id. at 13.
65. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.); see supra note 10.
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attorney may have few cases in the MDL, or may represent claimants with
only economic injuries. As a zealous advocate, an effective plaintiff’s
lawyer may have vigorously opposed consolidation in the MDL, or taken
advantage of opportunities presented in parallel state court proceedings
beyond the control of the MDL court and its orders. 66

The first and third sentences in this passage reflect the influence of the
“nirvana fallacy,” the idea that a proposal must be rejected unless it is
perfect. The right question is not whether a proposal “guarantees” that
claimants will receive loyal, high quality representation (judicial control
does not guarantee this either), but whether it makes this result more likely
and does so at acceptable cost. Because our proposal takes advantage of
markets (which tend to direct cases to good attorneys) and incentives
(which encourage lawyers with large inventories to represent clients well),
we think it deserves a try.
The second and fourth sentences reflect Dubay’s focus on “the role of the
MDL judge.” She dislikes our proposal because, instead of allowing MDL
judges to pick lawyers who can be relied on to help effectuate judges’
objectives, it might give control to troublemakers who dislike forced
consolidation and actively seek to circumvent it. Dubay never sees the
choice of cooperative lawyers as a difficulty, even though due process
problems arise when lawyers whose loyalties run to judges first and
claimants second gain control of MDLs. Her desire to make MDLs work
better for judges also blinds her to the corrosive impact that involvement in
plaintiffs’ affairs has on judges’ neutrality. The loss of neutrality does not
bother MDL judges, whose desire for global resolutions causes them to
want as much control of plaintiffs’ lawyers as they can get. Consequently,
it also does not bother Dubay.
When awarding common benefit fees in Vioxx, Judge Fallon need not
have sided with Dubay or with us. He chose the lead attorneys and set their
compensation terms long before our article appeared. Even so, he discussed
our proposal in dicta and, not surprisingly, he sided with Dubay.
Having a large number of cases in the MDL often indicates skill at
advertising, but does not guarantee the best lawyering or even the
selection of those best suited to handle the matter in a cooperative
endeavor which is crucial for MDL proceedings. . . . [T]he efficient and
successful resolution of an MDL is dependent on coordination and
cooperation of lead counsel for all sides. . . . In an MDL setting where
there can be a thousand plaintiffs’ attorneys it not only takes a good
lawyer to qualify for lead or liaison counsel but one who has the
diplomatic skills to coordinate the efforts of a diverse group. Selecting
lead and liaison counsel by a neutral party such as an MDL judge may not
be the best method but as between it and the selection by other counsel it
is the better way. Moreover, the selection of lead counsel by their fellow
attorneys would involve intrigue and side agreements which would make
Macbeth appear to be a juvenile manipulator.
Frequently,
recommendations by attorneys for positions on leadership committees are
66. DUBAY, supra note 6, at 59.
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governed more on friendship, past commitments and future hopes than on
current issues. 67

This passage is interesting for many reasons. First, it reflects the
unjustified hostility many judges have toward lawyers who advertise.
Advertising educates people about their rights, makes it easier for them to
find representation, facilitates competition, and enhances the public’s
opinion of lawyers. It works for lawyers the same way it works for other
professionals and service providers, such as doctors, dentists, pharmacists,
and hospitals, all of which advertise extensively. Judges should neither
complain about it nor treat lawyers who advertise as second-class attorneys.
Second, when discussing the characteristics of lead attorneys that are
“crucial for MDL proceedings,” 68 Judge Fallon means crucial for judges
who want global settlements, not for claimants who want to maximize their
recoveries. His desire for “cooperative” lawyers with “diplomatic skills”
who will contribute to “the efficient and successful resolution of an MDL”
reflects his immersion in a culture that glorifies settlements and deplores
trials. 69 Judge Fallon implicitly dismisses the possibility that what
plaintiffs need most is a team of aggressive lawyers who will get their cases
ready for trial in the shortest possible time. Yet, this is what the MDL
statute anticipates, 70 and it is also what due process requires. As the
Supreme Court observed in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, a plaintiff
who cannot threaten a defendant with a loss at trial cannot obtain fair value
for a claim in settlement. 71 The lawyers in charge of an MDL should be
strongly motivated to get plaintiffs’ cases ready for trial. 72
Third, Judge Fallon’s concern about intrigues, side agreements, and other
machinations involving lawyers competing for lead positions undoubtedly
reflects conduct he has witnessed or heard about in MDLs. 73 What he fails

67. Order & Reasons, supra note 3, at 3 n.4.
68. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. The Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006), authorizes transfers for
“consolidated pretrial proceedings” and provides that each transferred action “shall be
remanded . . . to the district from which it was transferred” when pretrial proceedings are
concluded. See also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26
(1998) (holding that the MDL court had to remand cases when pretrial proceedings were
complete and could not preside over the trial of a transferred case).
71. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) (observing that
“permitting class designation despite the impossibility of litigation” would deny class
members adequate representation because, when bargaining for settlement, “class
counsel . . . would be disarmed”).
72. Judge Fallon might respond to the statements in this paragraph by pointing out that
he presided over a series of bellwether trials in the Vioxx MDL. Bellwether trials can be
helpful sources of information, but they are no substitute for a realistic threat to remand all
cases consolidated in an MDL for trials in their original forums. A plausible argument can
be made that MDL judges should set firm deadlines by which pretrial preparations must be
completed so that cases can be remanded, and otherwise leave parties to handle settlement
negotiations as they wish. Negotiations would then occur in the shadows of predicted trial
results, as they should.
73. Dubay describes instances in which lawyers vying for lead positions formed or were
excluded from coalitions competing for control. DUBAY, supra note 6, at 31.
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to notice or mention is that judges encourage these behaviors by making
lead counsel positions profit centers. In context, the omission is
remarkable. Judge Fallon failed to recognize the connection between
existing MDL management procedures and unseemly competition for lead
counsel positions when writing an order that awarded a group of lead
attorneys $315 million.
He may see the connection now. After the Vioxx Fee Allocation
Committee (FAC) submitted its final recommendation for dividing the $315
million fund among attorneys who performed common benefit work,
dissatisfied lawyers submitted a boatload of objections. 74 They complained
that the lead attorneys, who staffed the FAC, rewarded themselves far too
lavishly; 75 that the FAC’s scoring system was arbitrary, skewed in favor of
the lead attorneys, and opaque; 76 that the FAC compensated some lawyers
at rates exceeding $2000 an hour while basing other lawyers’ awards on
hourly rates below $25; 77 that the FAC punished certain lawyers who
objected to its preliminary recommendations by cutting their payments; and
that certain lead attorneys exceeded their powers by disbursing fee money
without formal authorization from the court.78 I do not know whether these
complaints are valid, but the conflicts and the potential for abuse that exist
when lead lawyers set their own compensation could not be more apparent.
No less apparent is the fact that current arrangements make lead counsel
positions extraordinarily profitable. The FAC’s proposed allocation would
give the three law firms that supplied the lead and liaison counsel $111
million. 79 This enormous sum will come on top of the millions in fees the
74. Many disgruntled lawyers filed objections to the Fee Allocation Committee’s (FAC)
proposed allocation. For brief accounts and links to some of the complaints, see David
Bario, Fierce Fight Erupts Over $315 Million Vioxx Attorneys Fee Fund, AM. LAW. LITIG.
DAILY
(Feb.
24,
2011),
available
at
http://www.law.com/
jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202483003077; Dionne Searcey, The Vioxx Endgame: It’s All
About the Fees, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (March 3, 2011 6:01 PM ET),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/03/03/the-vioxx-endgame-its-all-about-the-fees/?mod=google
_news_blog.
75. Motley Rice’s Objection to the Vioxx Fee Allocation Committee’s Common Benefit
Fee Recommendation at Parts I–II.A., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D.
La. Feb. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Motley Rice’s Objection].
76. See id.
77. Cf. id. Parts I, II.B.
78. See Co-Lead Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional
Discovery Pursuing Side Deals Related to the Fund Awarded by this Court’s Order of
October 19, 2010 at 11–20, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Feb.
28,
2011),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
022811becnelfiling.pdf (arguing that certain lead attorneys improperly disbursed common
benefit funds without court approval).
79. Order, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2011),
available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/012011.or.pdf. The law firms and the
recommended amounts are Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C. ($40.9
million), Herman, Herman, Katz & Cotlar, L.L.P. ($32.5 million), and Seeger Weiss ($40.9
million). In addition, the law firm of Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP, which some objectors claim is
associated with the liaison counsel, is slated to receive $9 million. The total shared by firms
associated with the Lead and Liaison Counsel could therefore exceed $120 million. See
Joint Objection of Eric Weinberg, Chris Placitella and Cohen, Placitella and Roth to the Fee
Allocation Committee’s Jan. 20, 2010 Recommendation at 34, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab.
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firms will receive from their signed clients. By making compensation of
this magnitude available, judges encourage lawyers to use all possible
means, no matter how devious, to obtain lead counsel positions.
Although most of the objections filed in Vioxx concern the FAC’s fee
recommendations, some suggest that incentives created by judicial control
of common benefit fees corrupted the manner in which the lead attorneys
conducted the MDL. For example, the Motley Rice law firm alleges that
the six bellwether cases its lawyers prepared for trial were “pushed aside for
lesser cases selected by individuals who positioned themselves for a vast
overpayment of [fees from the] common fund.” 80 In other words, Motley
Rice contends that, when selecting Vioxx cases for bellwether trials, the
lead attorneys were more concerned about fattening their lodestars than
maximizing the value of plaintiffs’ claims. I do not know whether this is
true, but I can say that the allegation is plausible because the lodestar
method, which rewards time expended, creates perverse incentives. If lead
lawyers were paid contingent percentage fees, they would gain by selecting
the strongest cases for bellwether trials. But lead attorneys are paid by the
hour, at least in part. Consequently, they may gain by selecting weaker
bellwether cases in which they have invested larger amounts of
compensable time. Motley Rice’s complaint is plausible because judges
base common benefit fee awards in MDLs on time expended and hourly
rates.
The proposal Professor Miller and I designed would preserve the good
incentives that flow from contingent percentage fee arrangements. It would
also replace the political convention mentality that currently prevails in
MDLs with an ordinary business model of the sort that operates and works
well in joint ventures and law firms. Lawyers who are good at bringing in
business will team up with lawyers who are good at delivering legal
services of other types, including lawyers who are good at negotiating and
structuring mass settlements. The cost of common benefit work will be
shared on a pro rata basis but will not be a separate source of income for
lead attorneys. There will be problems, the main one being the possibility
of kickbacks from common benefit lawyers to the lead lawyers who engage
them. If the problems can be addressed, the proposal will restore a
desirable degree of order to the plaintiffs’ side of MDLs. Instead of
enriching themselves by unseemly means, lead attorneys who want to
enhance their compensation will have to increase claimants’ recoveries.
CONCLUSION
A real need exists to stretch judicial resources by aggregating related
claims and lawsuits. Neither this Article nor the article I co-authored with
Professor Miller constitutes an attack on aggregation per se. But aggregate
Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011) (asserting that “the firm that received the
third-highest hourly rate, Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP ($1325/hr.) is in partnership with FAC
member Russ Herman, seventh-rated at $1102/hr.”).
80. Motley Rice’s Objection, supra note 75, at Part II.B.
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proceedings can be conducted in many ways, some of which trample so
heavily on parties’ or lawyers’ rights as to be unlawful. Judicial
management techniques that interfere with the enforcement of substantive
legal rights and obligations are especially concerning. They achieve
economies of scale by preventing the civil justice system from doing its job,
which requires that parties represented by loyal advocates be able to try
cases at reasonable cost and with reasonable dispatch.
Professor Milton Handler identified this problem in a famous article
published many years ago. He argued that class action settlements were
“legalized blackmail” because judges enmeshed defendants in endless and
expensive litigation, effectively preventing them from ever vindicating
themselves at trial.81 Defendants could either settle or bear high litigation
costs indefinitely. Judge William G. Young recently made the analogous
point with respect to plaintiffs caught up in MDLs, pointing out that that
“[o]nce trial is no longer a realistic alternative, . . . [settlement] bargaining
focuses . . . on ability to pay, the economic consequences of the litigation,
and the terms of the minimum payout necessary to extinguish the plaintiff’s
claims.” 82 Due process is denied when any party, plaintiff or defendant,
loses merits-based bargaining leverage in settlement negotiations because a
judge is employing a procedure that prevents a case from being tried.
The American civil justice system is miraculous. Because of it, our
nation is uniquely devoted to the rule of law and the vindication of legal
claims. But we must understand the miracle, if we are to preserve it.
Structurally, the civil justice system works because parties represented by
loyal advocates are able to try cases in front of judges and juries that are
honest, independent, and neutral. MDL practices that saddle plaintiffs with
conflicted attorneys, that make trials practically impossible, or that involve
judges deeply in the management of plaintiffs’ representation, put the
miracle at risk.

81. Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971). I
describe Milton Handler’s view and other versions of the class action blackmail thesis in
Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1357 (2003).
82. DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 155 (D. Mass. 2006).

